

ences and functions of
ously degraded, institu-
-flection and persuasion
le and should be fostered.

sion I propose are high,
political science. If global
ned well, they will pro-
But if we bungle the job,
disastrous. Either oppres-
ould likely lead to conflict
mentation of global poli-
umane global governance
not inevitable. They will
ffort and on deep thinking

lobalization, our challenge
ne founders of this country:
king institutions for a polity
size and diversity. Only if we
age will we be doing our part
s "rebirth of freedom" on a
an—scale.

References

Firebaugh, Glen. 1999. "Empirics of World Income Inequality." *American Journal of Sociology* 104 (May): 1597–1631.

Held, David, et al. 1999. *Global Transformation: Politics, Economic and Culture*. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press.

Herz, John H. 1959. *International Politics in the Atomic Age*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Jervis, Robert. 1997. *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. [1977] 2001. *Power and Interdependence*. 3rd ed. New York: Addison Wesley.

Kindleberger, Charles P. 1973. *The World in Depression 1929–1939*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Pennock, J. Roland. 1966. "Political Development of Political Systems and Political Goods." *World Politics* 18 (April): 415–34.

Rawls, John. 1971. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Sen, Amartya K. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. New York: Knopf.

Prosperity

GABRIEL KOLKO

The United States and World Economic Power

* * *

To understand the unique economic interests and aspirations of the United States in the world, and the degree to which it benefits or loses within the existing distribution and structure of power and the world economy, is to define a crucial basis for comprehending as well as predicting its role overseas.

* * *

The United States and How Materials

The role of raw materials is qualitative rather than merely quantitative, and neither volume nor price can measure their ultimate significance and consequences. The economies and power of the advanced industrial nations of the United States in particular, are so dependent on the removal of even a small part,

steel industry must add approximately thirteen pounds of manganese to each ton of steel, and though the weight and value of the increase is a tiny fraction of the total, a modern diversified steel industry *must* have manganese. The same analogy is true of the entire relationship between the industrial and so-called developing nations: The nations of the Third World may be poor, but in the last analysis the industrial world needs their resources more than these nations need the West, for poverty is nothing new to peasantry cut off from export sectors, and trading with industrial states has not ended their subsistence living standards. In case of a total rupture between the industrial and supplier nations, it is the population of the industrial world that proportionately will suffer the most.

* * *

It is extraordinarily difficult to estimate the potential role and value of these scarce minerals to the United States, but certain approximate definitions are quite sufficient to make